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Chapter 1
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS
AND THEMES

of agricultural production units into large-scale
state and collective farms has been the most radical change of economic
institutions implemented by Marxist governments. In contrast to the nationalization of industry and the replacement of the market by central
planning and administration, this institutional change has transformed
not only ownership and the way in which production units have functioned, but also the way in which laborers have gone about their work
and have related to each other. The forced collectivization of agriculture
has also been a searing historical experience in Marxist regimes, during
which tens of millions died from starvation and mistreatment, while
countless others suffered greatly as a result of the coercion.1
History has not unfolded as nineteenth-century Marxists expected. Socialist revolutions arising from domestic political forces have not occurred
first in industrialized nations, but rather, for the most part, in predominantly agricultural countries with relatively low levels of economic development. Furthermore, despite commonplace notions about "peasant
conservatism" and the difficulty in reorganizing and reforming agricultural production, Marxist regimes have paid particular attention to transforming the institutions of the rural sector, even while agriculture was
the largest sector in the economy and when such changes were most difficult to implement. Furthermore, this institutional change occurred in
many countries without extensive agricultural mechanization or high IevT H E REORGANIZATION

1
Estimates of deaths in the Soviet Union resulting directly or indirectly from collectivization range from 11 million upward. For instance, according to the careful estimations of
Robert Conquest (1986), elimination of the rich farmers (kulaks) was a crucial part of the
collectivization drive in the Soviet Union and resulted in the deaths of 6.5 million. Another
8 million died in famines in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan that were an integral part of the
program. In China, estimates of deaths from land reform and collectivization from 1946
through 1957 range from 250,000 to 5 million or more; Moise (1983, p. 142) estimates between 1 and 1.5 million for the land reform, although later evidence suggests this may be
high. The real violence came in the period 1958-61 when the government attempted to
consolidate the collective farms into communes and precipitated a famine, when, according
to the estimates of Banister (1987, p. 85), 30 million died. In most other Marxist regimes
land reforms and collectivization were not so violent, although as discussed in chapter 4,
the governments employed considerable coercion.
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CHAPTER 1

els of rural education and where administration of large-scale agriculture
was probably neither cost effective nor necessary. In Marxist terminology, the relations of production were probably too advanced in comparison to the forces of production. Finally, although Marx emphasized the
relatively similar paths of development of industry and agriculture and
laid great moral stress on the value of all types of physical labor, most of
these Marxist governments have organized the two sectors in dissimilar
ways and have treated urban and rural workers quite differently, often to
the disadvantage of the latter.
Contemporary Marxists, particularly those influenced by the ideas of
Stalin, have ready explanations for each of these apparent deviations from
classical Marxist doctrines. But in analyzing such issues, Marxists of any
stripe have greater difficulty in answering a more basic question: What is
the best way for a government professing to follow the ideas of Marx and
Lenin to organize agriculture so as to enhance the economic development of an entire nation? Although Marxist-Leninist doctrines about the
organization of agriculture may leave much to be desired, discussion in
the West about the optimal organization of agriculture is certainly not
much more advanced. Enormous attention has been focused on "saving
the family farm," but many more organizational issues need to be discussed. Indeed, relatively little data are available to study many critical
problems—for example, the horizontal linkages between farms or vertical
linkages between farms and either upstream or downstream enterprises
in the chain of production. In contrast to the analysis of the organization
of industry, no formal academic field studying the organization of agriculture exists; no scholarly journals devoted to the topic fill the shelves
of libraries; and no standard analytic methods are available to resolve disputes on policy questions.
First and foremost, this is a study about the organization of Marxist
economies, both in theory and practice. I have chosen agriculture because it allows a series of analytic issues to be examined in an easier fashion than other sectors would allow. This book is an examination of ideas
and their influence, and how, given the heterogeneity of agriculture,
these ideas can be stretched to their furthest limits. But this is also an
empirical investigation of the origins, organization, and development of
agriculture in thirty-three identified Marxist regimes shown on the maps
here. In order to provide some perspective, I also investigate certain aspects of the organization of agriculture in market economies, both to test
various Marxist propositions about the development of agriculture and to
illuminate the differences and similarities of agricultural organization in
various economic systems.
Finally, this book is an attempt to synthesize a vast and straggly scholarly literature in both East and West on a number of theoretical and em-
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pirical issues about agricultural organization. In order to keep the discussion manageable, many issues cannot be discussed in depth and the
reader is referred to the appropriate references for further analysis. I
must also leave to others the task of carrying out detailed case studies to
advance our knowledge of agriculture in individual countries. Nevertheless, I hope that the analytical framework and the comparative perspective provided herein enriches the case-study approach by allowing a separation of key causal factors. For instance, which aspects of agricultural
organization and policy can be attributed to Marxist-Leninist doctrines?
Or to the type of agriculture practiced in various countries? Or to the
particular historical circumstances of the different nations? Or to the decisions arising from the unique political mechanisms of particular
nations? I also try to show why, despite the deficiencies in performance
of collectivized agriculture, it is highly doubtful that state and collective
farms will disappear quickly, even in some nations where Marxist parties
have been voted out of power.
But first it is necessary to delimit the topic, especially by defining two
crucial terms, socialist agriculture and Marxist regimes, so that the subject matter and the sample can be specified. Then I briefly summarize
the role of agriculture in the sample countries in order to provide an
overview of the economic context within which agriculture is organized.
Finally, I indicate briefly the major questions investigated and the path
along which they are approached.
SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE

For purposes of this study I define socialist agriculture in terms of institutions of production rather than particular types of governmental intervention. Collectivization is the process including nationalization or expropriation of private farms and the creation of large-scale cooperative
and state farms. For most of recorded history, governments have interceded in the agricultural sector in order to reinforce or suppress market
forces and channels of distribution, to encourage production, or to influence rural incomes. For this reason governmental intervention per se
provides little indication about the economic system of agriculture. The
definition of socialist agriculture as represented by institutions of production gives rise, however, to a number of complications.
General Considerations
Marx and Engels told us little about institutions of agricultural production functioning in socialist economies. They made only scattered comments from which emerges a murky picture of what agriculture would be
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like when full communism arrives.2 They foresaw an economy of high
productivity and disciplined workers, but with no markets or money, so
that exchange of products between urban and rural areas would, in some
manner, be "direct." Such an arrangement would be facilitated by the
fact that the ideas and outlooks of those living in the two areas would be
similar.
Up to now, Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978 has been the only
Marxist nation to attempt to realize such a communist agricultural system. The Pol Pot regime expropriated all land, formed relatively largescale, self-sufficient production units, and effectively eliminated both
trade and money. Party or government cadre—often soldiers in their
teens—directed the labor force, providing workers with agricultural inputs received from the central government, and distributing food rations,
housing, and clothing according to norms unrelated to an individual's
work. Food was also communally consumed. The farms, in turn, supplied
the central government with deliveries of particular goods.3 The scholarly
community has focused little attention on this unique attempt to realize
Marx's vision, in part because the mass murders accompanying this Kampuchean transformation have been more important to study, and in part
because high productivity, a crucial aspect of full communism, was not
achieved in this nation.
More usual production institutions of socialist agriculture are state
farms, collective farms, and communes, all of which are forms of largescale agriculture. It is, of course, possible to have a socialized urban sector without a socialist agricultural sector, a situation arising in Poland and
Yugoslavia from the mid-1950s to the present, as well as in a number of
Marxist African nations. It is also possible to conceive of a socialist agricultural sector that produces a plantation crop exhibiting economies of
scale, combined with a predominantly private urban sector that provides
complementary products and services. This latter system does not appear
to be stable in the long run and is not exemplified in any of the nations
of the sample. 4 Socialist agricultural institutions are usually accompanied
2

This discussion is based on Pryor (1985b), which provides all of the relevant quotations.
A highly detailed eyewitness account of life on one of these units is provided by May
(1986), and other interesting views are presented in Kiernan and Boua (1982 chap. 10).
Most journalists and scholars have focused their attention on such notable aspects of this
system as the extreme cruelty of the government and the division of the population into
different classes so that each received different amounts of food and other rations, rather
than on more mundane aspects of how the economy worked. By far the most systematic
examination of the economic system is by Twining (1989), although many gaps in his study
remain due to lack of reliable information.
4
It has been most closely approximated in Sao Tome and Seychelles. Before independence, both were predominantly plantation economies in which the plantations were primarily owned by foreigners (especially in the former). Sao Tome immediately nationalized
3
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by certain other features that are neither necessary nor sufficient for the
system to function, for instance, rules against firing workers on state
farms or removing members from collective farms.
It is important to emphasize that communal agricultural systems found
in some developing nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have little
in common with socialist agriculture. In the former systems, the community can place restrictions on what a farmer can do with the land, on
the date when certain agricultural activities can begin or end, and even
on the farming techniques that are employed. In some cases land is also
distributed by traditional political leaders, but nevertheless, families
farm the land individually and individual wealth is not merged. Of
course, cooperative work efforts occur and may be of considerable significance, but they are both informal and voluntary; these arrangements include trading labor or participating in work gangs that spend a certain
amount of time on the farms of each member (Pryor 1977). In contrast to
the beliefs of African political leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania
or Leopold Senghor of Senegal, experience in Africa has shown that communal agriculture has little in common with collectivized farming and,
indeed, these systems do not lead easily to socialist agriculture.

State Farms
A state farm is simply a factory-in-the-field that is owned by the government. In most cases the government or a government board appoints a
director, who hires workers and manages the farm in the same manner
as the hired manager of a capitalist plantation. Although the workers may
receive bonuses based on production, their primary source of income is
a wage, and the government thus absorbs most risks of production.
Some cases are, however, hard to classify. For instance, in Yugoslavia
the public sector has certain residual rights in the nonprivate farms (for
example, the members cannot sell the assets and pocket the receipts), so
that these enterprises might be considered state farms. Nevertheless,
these "socially owned" farms operate essentially as producer cooperatives
and are run by worker councils, which set the basic policy guidelines and
hire the farm managers. Thus these farms combine features of both systems. In other East European nations, as I will indicate, the difference
between state and collective farms has eroded.
State farms can be formal production units ultimately administered by
a central authority such as a ministry of agriculture. Other types of state
farms, sometimes called "institutional farms," include those farms atthese estates and Seychelles began a slow but relentless nationalization drive. Both nations,
however, also began to create government-owned enterprises in the urban sector.
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tached to state-owned industrial plants such as the podkhozi in the
USSR, farms operated by special development agencies (for instance, in
Seychelles), farms operated by the army, local governments, primary
schools, or universities (for example, experimental stations) or farms operated by the Marxist party (for instance, in the Congo). In most of the
countries these institutional farms hold only a small percentage of the
land in the state farm sector; a notable exception is Benin, however,
where they constitute 95 percent of the state farm sector.5 In other countries, these institutional farms, although relatively small in total area, increased in importance. Most notably, during the 1980s the government of the Soviet Union encouraged factories to administer farms in
order to supply food for factory canteens. As Hedlund has emphasized
(1989), these attempts to increase total farm output often divert specialized managerial resources in industry from where they can best be employed.
According to Stalinist dogma, the state farm is a "higher form of socialism" than the collective farm, and until the late 1980s some Marxist regimes such as Albania, Mongolia, Romania, and the USSR were slowly
converting their collective farms to state farms. By no means is this
dogma universally accepted: during the mid- and late-1980s Nicaragua
converted a number of its original state farms into cooperatives (or even
divided them up into private farms). The government of Seychelles has
also announced its intention to transform its state farms into cooperatives
once the state farms are operating on a profitable basis; this does not,
however, seem likely to occur in the near future.
State farms are, of course, not unique to socialism, and they also exist
in almost all capitalist nations, serving either as experimental farms or in
some cases a source of revenue when they are leased out to private farmers. These farms represent either remnants of the original "crown land,"
or of past land reforms, or of deliberate attempts by the government to
set up a limited number of government farms. Indeed, some instances
can also be cited in which nominally capitalist nations such as Malawi
have more extensive and more successful state farm systems than nominally Marxist regimes such as Madagascar (Pryor 1990c).
Collective Farms
I use the term collective farm to designate a farm where production is
carried out jointly (a group of people work together under a single man5

According to the data from SEV (annual, 1988), in the mid-1980s such institutional
farms amounted to about 16 percent of total farm land in Romania, 9 percent in Czechoslovakia, and less than 6 percent in the other Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA) nations. Hedlund (1989) has an illuminating analysis of the podhozy in the USSR,
while Despris and Khischuk (1990) explore those operated by the military. The Benin

This content downloaded from 130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 13:46:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

AN OVERVIEW

11

agement) and where the net receipts or income of the farm (receipts after
taxes have been paid and agricultural inputs have been purchased) are
divided among the members according to a formula that takes into partial
account the amount of work the members contributed to the common
effort. The government contract with the farm usually has two parts: a
fixed rent (that is, compulsory deliveries of certain crops at a specified
price) and an agreement to buy all produce above this limit, usually at a
higher price. The collective farm members bear all risks of production
shortfalls. In some cases the government has modified this residual-income principle by providing a floor income for members of the cooperative; in these cases the farms receive a government subsidy or loan if net
receipts are not sufficient to cover expenses and payments to members.
In some countries (e.g., Cuba, Hungary, and Bulgaria until 1959) these
farms paid rent to the farmers who brought land into the collective; in
other countries no compensation was paid. In some countries the land
belonged to the collective as a whole; in other countries, to the government (a matter discussed in greater detail in chapter 3); and in still other
countries (e.g., most of the nations of East Europe) to the people who
brought the land into the collective, or their heirs. In some countries
(e.g., Yugoslavia and, to a lesser degree, Bulgaria and Cuba in the late
1980s) the farms had certain elements of self-management with elected
representatives on the administrative council of the farm; in other countries, the farm was administered in a highly centralized fashion.
As Adam Fforde (1989, p. xii) warns us: "Knowledge of formal, or legally constituted, social structures does not necessarily tell us much
about underlying 'reality.' " For purposes of discussion in the following
chapters, it is useful to keep in mind that collective farms can operate in
quite different ways, even with the same formal rules:
1. In a cooperative farm the members appoint their own managers and
make their own decisions. They are voluntary organizations, and, in their
occasional appearance in several Marxist regimes, they have often had
quite different members from year to year (e.g., in Laos, as shown by
Evans 1990, chap. 4). Such a producer cooperative must be distinguished
from a service cooperative, in which a group of people band together to
market their crop, buy agricultural inputs, rent a combine, hire a technician, or participate together in some project perhaps related to farming
but not directiy involved in all phases of the productive process. Both of
case, discussed briefly by Codin (1986, pp. 201-3), has arisen because foreign plantations
were minuscule (less than three thousand hectares in the 1930s) so that the government did
not find much land to nationalize easily. Most of the institutional farms in Benin (64 percent
of the area) were plots of towns and schools which, relying on unpaid labor, produced a
crop whose sales yielded funds to finance investment in infrastructure. Such farms, of
course, acted to convert a tax-in-kind to money revenues. The other farms were usually
vertically integrated agricultural processing enterprises owned by the state.
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these, of course, are also different from a consumer cooperative, in which
consumers unite to purchase in bulk in order to reduce the retail margin
they otherwise would pay. Although simple, these distinctions are often
blurred and, as a result, have given rise to enormous confusion; for instance, the varied interpretations of Lenin's last pronouncement on cooperatives (see chapter 2). A producer cooperative must also be distinguished from various forms of mutual aid or cooperative arrangements
among farmers who, however, farm their lands individually.
2. In a pseudo-cooperative farm the unit has few cooperative elements
and is really managed as a state farm. One type of pseudo-cooperative
farm existed in the USSR for many decades: the state and party appointed the farm directors and expected them to meet production and
other goals determined by the government. The directors, in turn, managed the farm in an hierarchical fashion; members had almost no influence over who led them, how they were led, or what work they carried
out. These pseudo-cooperative farms had for several decades a secondclass status: they received no state subsidies; they always had a lower
priority in obtaining scarce agricultural inputs; they could not own their
own machines but had to rent machine services from the Machine Tractor Station (MTS); their older members received no social insurance payments from the government; and the members had to absorb the agricultural risks by receiving a share of the net income, rather than a fixed
wage. A strange type of pseudo-cooperative farm occurred in Benin in
the 1970s and 1980s where farmers in a particular area were forced to
combine their land and rent it to a cooperative (a p4rimdtre or cooparative d'amSnagement rural) which, in turn, was managed by a team from
a state company. Both the landlords and the landless in the area also had
the option of working for the cooperative and receiving a wage. 6 Still
other variants of pseudo-cooperatives could be found in other countries.
Pseudo-cooperatives were most often found in nations where the party
and/or government was highly organized in rural areas; for example,
many East European nations and China.
3. In a nominal-cooperative farm the collective unit can serve either as
a mask of the operations for a private company or of agriculturalists actually farming their land individually. One interesting example of the former has occurred in Guyana (Standing and Szal 1979, pp. 72-73; Thomas
1983) where groups of private individuals, such as urban civil servants,
organized cooperatives. They obtained free land, low-interest credit, and
tax privileges and then farmed the land individually, hiring outside labor
for the actual farm work. Other Guyanese cooperatives had "dormant
6

This type of pseudocooperative began under a previous non-Marxist government.
Mondjannagni (1977) and Godin (1986) provide further details.
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members" with formal voting rights that allow a private firm to call itself
a cooperative. A different type of nominal-cooperative farm existed in
Viet Nam during the 1970s where the collective farm often served as a
mask for individuals or hamlets to carry out their individual agricultural
activities with a minimum of outside interference. 7 In the highlands of
Georgia in the Soviet Union, the collective farms also appeared to play a
strategic role in the private economy of its members and, as such, were
different from collectives in the Russian Republic.8 In different forms
nominal-collectives also arose in still other countries such as Cape Verde
(or the "pre-cooperatives" in the Congo), where the size of the collective
fields has been relatively small in comparison to the private fields on the
same farm. In Laos, collective farms were so loosely organized that for
many years farmers could pull their land out of the cooperative relatively
easily (Evans 1990). The Somali "range cooperatives" represented a nominal-cooperative in a herding context: cattle were held privately and
pieces of range land were assigned to individual families who, in some
manner, were supposed to cooperate with each other and to obey the
grazing rules set forth by the government. Sometimes political authorities foster nominal-cooperatives as the first step toward full cooperativization; in other cases nominal-cooperatives arise where party discipline
is weak in the rural areas, a situation occurring in most Third World
Marxist regimes. Nominal cooperatives are most likely to be found where
the state and party are weakly organized in the rural areas; for instance,
Africa, Yemen, and southeast Asian nations such as Laos and Viet Nam.
Collective farms are not the exclusive property of Marxist regimes and
they have been sponsored in some form by non-Marxist governments as
well. For instance, in the 1980s they existed on a large scale in Algeria,
Israel, and Tanzania and, on a lesser scale, in other nations such as
Ghana. Still other non-Marxist regimes feature small-scale cooperative
farms, either in the form of small groups of people voluntarily banding
together to farm jointly or in the form of small-scale experiments under
7
According to Fforde (1989, pp. 6, 80), up to 75 percent of the collective farms in North
Viet Nam were nominal in the late 1970s. His definition of nominal is somewhat looser than
mine, since he includes farms in which the key decision-making unit is the brigade or hamlet and, although some production is collective, some important economic activities such as
pig raising were carried out privately.
8
Dragadze's village study (1988) suggests that a major function of the collective farm has
been to supply foodstuffs to members that they could not obtain in stores and that the farm
was organized in a sufficiently loose fashion so that one family member often substituted for
the formal member in order to accumulate family work points for the distribution of agricultural products not delivered to the state. Moskoff (1984, p. 159) presents data showing
that collective farm workers in Georgia worked on the farm many fewer days than those in
the Russian Republic.
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governmental aegis; an example of this occurred in the United States in
the late 1930s.»
Communes
The term commune has widely different meanings, but in this study I use
the word to describe a large-scale farm unit that has governmental powers as well; that is, the same authorities carry out both economic and
political functions.10 These units of production could be found in China
from the late 1950s to the early 1980s, Mongolia from the late 1950s
through the late 1980s, Kampuchea under Pol Pot, or to a much lesser
extent, Ethiopia in the late 1970s (in those cases where some Peasant
Associations formed cooperatives). I omit from consideration those situations where economic and political power structures are fused in an informal manner. Most often these large-scale communes operate according to the cooperative principle in the division of the income, although
in some cases the salary system appears to be used.
In many cases it is difficult to decide whether a particular production
unit is a cooperative or part of a commune in which government authorities at a local level play a critical role in the management of the unit. For
instance, in North Korea after 1961, the County (Kun) Agricultural Management Committee received extensive powers to participate in farm decision-making, although the cooperatives still retained their formal identity. u If this means that the county governments are the predominant
unit in farm decision-making, then North Korean collectives must be
classified as communes, with the smaller units acting as profit centers;
the exact manner in which decision-making powers are distributed between the county and the farm are difficult for an outsider to determine.
Similarly, by the late 1960s in China, the teams (in this case, villages)
were profit centers with considerable autonomy. If the central communal
administration had relatively little power, then the Chinese communes
9
Infield (1945) tells the bizarre story of the 262 cooperative and state farms established
in the late 1930s in the United States. Zablocki (1980) describes voluntary efforts to establish cooperative farms in the United States thorough the mid-1970s.
10
My use of the term commune should not be confused with other meanings of the word;
e.g., the cooperative farms (found in the USSR in the 1920s and discussed by Wesson
[1963]) where the members eat or live together, or the village communities of nineteenthcentury Russia, or the small governmental units (without any agricultural functions) in some
countries such as France or Yugoslavia. These units are not discussed in this study.
11
I refer to East Germany, North Korea, South Yemen, and the Congo, rather than the
German Democratic Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, and the People's Republic of the Congo so as to avoid
confusion with their capitalist counterparts, which might also be considered democratic,
albeit in a different sense.
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should be considered as a network of cooperative farms operating within
a governmental unit called a commune. Although these kinds of definitional problems raise difficulties of classification, they do not impede
other aspects of this analysis.
A Case Study: The USSR
We can understand these different forms of agriculture organization more
concretely and, at the same time, gain a clearer idea about some of the
major themes of this study by examining briefly the experience of the
Soviet Union. I must stress, however, that the Soviet experience is not
typical of other Marxist regimes and that the purpose of the many minicase studies of countries in this book is to provide flesh for the barebone
definitions and generalizations.
Before the major Soviet collectivization drive began in the last two
months of 1929, individual peasants farmed over 95 percent of the land;
moreover, the overwhelming majority of these peasants belonged to village communities, which controlled economic life of the village (Nove
1969, p. 106). The government's role in agriculture was primarily as a
purchaser of grain; and in the mid-1920s it bought roughly three-quarters
of the marketed grain. As noted in chapter 3, unlike most Marxist regimes, collectivization had not been preceded by a government-directed land reform, although considerable ownership changes had occurred through peasant land takeovers after the revolution.
Although in chapter 2 1 discuss in detail the many reasons for collectivization, three economic reasons appeared most important in the USSR:
the need to achieve greater production and marketed sales through the
alleged economies of large-scale farming; the necessity to modernize agriculture; and the desire to force farmers to sell their crops to the government at low prices so that the profits could be used to finance industrialization. The degrees to which these and other goals of collectivization
were achieved are analyzed for many Marxist regimes in chapters 7 and
8.
The government consolidated private farms into collectivized farms
with the aid of specially recruited urban workers and party officials.
Within several months more than half of the peasant population had
joined the collectives. The administrative excesses committed to achieve
these results were so extreme that in March 1930 Stalin, who initiated
this "voluntary" drive, attempted to deflect criticism by placing most of
the blame on the zeal of local officials. Other Marxist regimes that collectivized later learned a great deal from these policy lessons (see chapter
4). Subsequently, more than half of the collective farms disbanded, but
the offensive resumed and in 1934 more than three-quarters of all peas-
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ant households and crop areas were collectivized and organized into
farms averaging roughly seventy households and four hundred hectares.
Few of these collective farms were genuine producer cooperatives—
many were pseudo-cooperatives directed by cadre selected by the party
or government and most of the remainder were nominal-cooperatives
formed by farmers wishing to avoid outside interference in their activities. Over time, however, most of the nominal cooperatives were transformed into pseudo-cooperatives. Autonomous and genuine producer cooperatives were not a feature of Soviet agriculture.
In the mid-1920s Stalin had stressed the formation of large state farms,
but the difficulties inherent in this policy rapidly became apparent. As a
result, in the collectivization drive, the government placed most stress
on the formation of collective farms. In 1934, for instance, state farms
covered less than 10 percent of total crop area. They were somewhat
larger than the collective farms and averaged about 430 workers and
2,400 hectares (USSR, Central Statistical Board 1969, p. 127).
The state farms received detailed output, input, and investment plans;
furthermore, if costs could not be met, they received subsidies or loans.
They were less autonomous than collective farms, which received delivery and input quotas of a less detailed nature, but which could not rely
on subsidies. In the early years farm officials carried out considerable
experimentation on organizing and administering these collective and
state farms, a topic receiving greater attention in chapter 5.
After the Second World War the government began to consolidate collective farms into much larger units and, in addition, to transform many
into state farms. After the death of Stalin in 1953, these trends accelerated so that by the late 1980s state farms comprised more than twice the
land of the collective farms (see table 5.1). Furthermore, the government
dissolved the MTSs and partly sold, partly gave away their equipment to
the collective farms. Collective farmers, moreover, began to receive a
minimum wage and, although producer prices paid to these farms were
increased several-fold, subsidies to these farms increased dramatically, as
did their unpaid debts, which were periodically cancelled. In brief, the
differences between the collective and state farms began to disappear, a
trend apparent in other Marxist regimes as well.
In the late 1980s the Gorbachev government took the first tentative
moves toward decollectivization; that is, the conversion of state and collective farms into either private (corporate or individual) farms, or tenant
farms with long-term leases, or genuine producer cooperatives. In the
USSR these policy steps were taken mainly in the form of leasehold contracts to households and, in certain republics such as Georgia, the breaking up of highly unprofitable collective and state farms into individual
farms. As indicated in chapters 10 and 11, by the end of 1990 this decol-

This content downloaded from 130.58.34.221 on Wed, 14 Jul 2021 13:46:50 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

AN OVERVIEW

17

lectivization movement was still in its initial stages, in contrast with a
number of other nations under discussion in this book.
The aims of collectivization and the organization of agriculture that resulted had a considerable impact both on the functioning of the farms (see
chapters 5 and 6) and on the policies pursued by the government to encourage production (see chapter 7). These elements, in turn, greatly influenced the performance of the agricultural sector (see chapter 8). Further consideration of these implications of the organizational forms,
however, would put us far ahead of our story.
The Institutional Mix
As I discuss in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4, the institutions of socialist agriculture are by no means uniform among Marxist regimes. Only
a few Marxist regimes have communes, and the mix between private,
cooperative, and state farms varies considerably. To provide an overview,
four clusters of countries can be distinguished in the 1980s: (1) Some
Marxist regimes did not have a very large socialist agricultural sector. In
some cases, for example, the majority of African Marxist regimes, as well
as Grenada, Poland, and Yugoslavia, this was because not much collectivization was carried out. In other cases such as China, Kampuchea, Laos,
or Viet Nam in the late 1980s, this was because these nations carried out
some type of decollectivization; (2) In other Marxist regimes, mostly in
East Europe, the agricultural sector was dominated by collective farms;
(3) In still other Marxist nations, most notably Bulgaria (in the mid1980s), Cuba, Guyana, Sao Tome, and the USSR, state farms predominated; and (4) In a final group including China (in the 1970s) and Mongolia (in the 1970s and 1980s) the agricultural sector was dominated by
communes with the subunits run as pseudo-cooperatives. An important
question explored in chapter 3 is why particular nations have adopted
one or another form of socialist agriculture.

MARXIST REGIMES

The purpose of this brief discussion is to select the sample for analysis,
not to condemn or praise certain nations. I choose my particular definition for analytical convenience to examine particular questions; for other
types of comparative studies, a much different definition of "Marxist regime" may be more suitable. In particular, I am interested in the impact
and implementation of Marxist ideas and have shaped my definition accordingly.
Since Marx wrote little about the operation of socialist economies or
agriculture, some readers may be uncomfortable with my terminology
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and wish to label the countries in my sample as "Marxist-Leninist" or
"socialist" or "communist." Each of these labels also raises problems, especially for developing nations whose governments have embraced Marxist ideas and ideals, but which have neither a Leninist-type political party
nor the resources to implement the type of welfare and other programs
associated with socialism.
The Approach of This Study
The classical definition of socialism refers to ownership of the means of
production. Table 1.1 provides a rough measure of the importance of governmental ownership. A brief glance at the table reveals that this share
varies enormously among the countries, in part because some nations
have started along this path at an earlier date and in part because various
governments have forced the pace of nationalization at different speeds.
The pattern of nationalization is quite distinct (a matter discussed for East
Europe in Pryor 1973, chapter 2). For our purposes it is necessary to note
only that the degree of nationalization in agriculture is generally much
lower in most other sectors; the exceptions, such as Sao Tome and Seychelles, have arisen from very particular historical circumstances. It
should also be mentioned that certain non-Marxist socialist countries
have a much higher percentage of workers in the state and cooperative
sector (59.8 percent in Algeria in the early 1980s, according to Algeria
1981, p. 59) than most of the countries in this table.
As I have argued at length elsewhere (Pryor 1986, chap. 8), distinguishing Marxist regimes by ownership or by other economic criteria
such as the relative share of governmental expenditures in the gross domestic product (GDP), or replacement of market mechanisms of allocation by governmental central planning and economic administration, is
not very useful since most Third World nations calling themselves Marxist and attempting to achieve a socialist economy would be excluded from
this list. For the same reason distinguishing Marxist regimes by the degree to which they are pursuing general socialist development policies
such as increasing social equality and participation in national decisionmaking, development of idealistic individuals unfettered by acquisitive
motives, or reduction of alienation also does not seem helpful.
A more fruitful approach in selecting a sample of Marxist regimes employs both ideological and implementation criteria. A necessary but not
sufficient ideological condition is whether the leading officials in the government have been strongly influenced by Marxist ideas; that is, if a communist party controls the government or if the elite in power has been
strongly influenced by some version of Marxism. In some Third World
countries such as Guinea-Bissau or Sao Tome, an official declaration of
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TABLE

1.1

T h e Share of t h e Labor Force in t h e Public and Cooperative Sectors
State sector

Cooperative sector

Date

AFF

Other
Sectors

Total

Africa
Angola
Benin
Cape Verde
Congo
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mozambique
Sao Τοηιέ
Seychelles
Somalia
Zimbabwe

1984
1980
1985
1982
n.a.
1984
1980
1980
1981
1985
1981
1983

2.2%
0.4
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.8
2.9
86.0
57.5
0.6
4.0

30-50%
11.7
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
41.3
70.4
60.0
58.3
47.8
28.4

9-14%
3.5
51.2
14.7
n.a.
13.4
5.3
12.9
74.5
58.2
4.8
25.5

Americas
Cuba
Grenada
Guyana
Nicaragua

1981
1981
1980
1982

75.6
15.7
42.3
11.0

98.5
38.1
23.4
33.0

Asia
Afghanistan
China
Kampuchea
Korea, North
Laos
Mongolia
Viet Nam
Yemen, South

1981
1986
n.a.
1965
n.a.
1979
1984
1982

0.6
3.3
n.a.
8.0
n.a.
n.a.
10.9
10.7

26.1
64.4
n.a.
100.0
n.a.
n.a.
21.1
47.5

Europe
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Germany, East
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR
Yugoslavia

1979
1965
1985
1987
1987
1978
1977
1970
1981

n.a.
16.1
99.1
19.8
50.4
14.1
11.9
39.4
11.6

n.a.
90.1
98.8
87.6
11.6
96.4
92.5
99.2
94.0

AFF

Other
Sectors

Total

0.6%

0.4%

0.5%

1.7

8.4

2.2

93.3
31.9
25.6
22.8

3.8

0.0

0.9

2.2

0.0

1.0

10.6
27.1
n.a.
43.2
n.a.
63.1
13.8
42.8

8.7
0.2

0.0
16.9

5.3
6.7

92.0

0.0

56.8

n.a.
70.0
30.7

n.a.
n.a.
5.3

36.6
50.3
5.5

49.8
57.3
82.7
8.4
41.3
98.9 (combined pv.iblic and cooperative)
80.2
78.7
7.0
14.8
86.8
47.0
11.6
7.4
71.6
6.8
n.a.
2.0
62.8
72.2
5.9
30.3
84.1
59.5
0.9
15.5
68.5
0.4
n.a.
n.a.

Source: See Statistical Note A. For Zimbabwe and South Yemen, the percentage of production is used;
for Poland, the state sector outside agriculture includes the small number of cooperatives. For several
other countries the calculations are very approximate, so "other sectors" cannot be easily estimated.
Notes: AFF = agriculture, forestry, and fishing.
The percentages represent the share of the economically active population who are working in enter
prises owned either by some level of government or cooperatively. In cases of mixed ownership, the
practices of the statistical agencies of each nation are used, since sufficient data to adjust for complete
comparability are not available.
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this adherence has not been made, but it is clear from other evidence
that Marxist ideas have played a crucial and open role in intellectual life
of the ruling party. The strength of the commitment is important, because some political leaders such as Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central
African Republic have, at one time or another, proclaimed their country
to be Marxist or to be "following" scientific socialism primarily to obtain
foreign aid from the Soviet Union.
Ideally we should supplement self-identification with a checklist of
specific beliefs; for example, in the existence of a vanguard party serving
as the leading political/economic force in the nation, in the importance of
the class struggle in forging a socialist nation, in scientific socialism transcending all local characteristics of the society, and so forth. But in many
cases it is difficult to determine the official party line on these matters or,
when these phrases are used, to ascertain what they really mean or the
strength of belief in these doctrines. Thus these more sophisticated ideological criteria cannot easily be employed.
Self-identification, of course, has its own difficulties and its use raises
the problem of the audience and purpose for such symbolic declarations.
For tactical purposes, the party or governing elites in some countries
have not openly announced the influence of Marxist ideas on their policies. The self-identification criterion must be modified to include three
other cases: (a) Particular governments such as the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada, which readily acknowledged the influence of Marxism in its closed councils (Pryor 1986), but for political
reasons did not make this announcement publicly; (b) Other governments such as Cape Verde were dominated by parties founded by those
who were Marxist, but they did not choose to identify themselves in this
manner in public and we have no information about their self identification behind closed doors. Without evidence to the contrary, we must
infer that they are Marxist parties; (c) Some other governments, whose
self-identification and founding ideologies are vague, must be included
because they have adopted as principal policy measures a set of economic, political, and social policies similar to those followed in openly
declared Marxist regimes; for instance, the Seychelles government has
announced its intention to eliminate the private ownership of the means
of production in order to eliminate exploitation (Reno 1982, p. 30).
An important implementation condition is that the government must
have sufficient political power to effect crucial structural changes in the
economy in a socialist direction. In some cases such as the Comoro Islands (the Soilih government), the government did not last long enough
to effect these changes. In other countries such as San Marino, the selfproclaimed Communist Party dominated the ruling coalition for some
years, but was unable to carry out significant structural reforms. Simi-
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larly, in countries such as Surinam (under Desi Bouterse), Ghana (under
Jerry Rawlings), or Chile (under Salvadore Allende), the leading political
leaders may have had Marxist sympathies or have been allied politically
with Marxists, but they were also unable to institute key structural
changes in the economy.
This implementation criterion does not mean that the Marxist party
has achieved a "revolutionary breakthrough"—that is, a decisive change
in the society—but that it has at least been able to implement a sufficient
number of Marxist policies to reveal the orientation of the government.
This is because I wish to include in the sample those regimes that have
attempted but failed to put major Marxist agricultural organizational
ideas into practice in order to be better able to isolate those factors permitting these structural changes to be realized.
My criteria, of course, are difficult to apply because of problems in
deciding whether the political beliefs of the dominant party should be
considered as Marxist or as some other brand of socialism; for example,
African socialism. In addition, the difference between populism and
Marxism is often difficult to distinguish (Keller 1987). In two cases (Guyana and Madagascar), the government has proclaimed the strong influence of Marxism on its program, but the Communist Party recognized by
the Soviet and other communist parties is not the ruling party. I follow
my own criteria and consider these countries as Marxist regimes.
Difficulties of classification also appear concerning countries in which
a significant Thermidorean reaction has occurred; that is, where the government or Marxist party has lost its ideological fervor but nevertheless
maintains many of the institutions and policies arising when Marxist ideology played a more active role. I have, for instance, included Somalia
but excluded Mali since the latter country has maintained fewer of the
"socialist institutions." A final problem of classification arises because
Marxist-Leninist ideas may no longer be determinant in implementing
(in contrast to making) policy. For instance, Mathieu Kerekou, the President of Benin, had a useful insight when he complained in 1981 that "the
government and revolutionary structures no longer exist in reality, for
the bureaucrats have virtually seized power on the government's back"
(Decalo 1987, p. 11). Although this may have been merely an excuse for
his own failures of leadership, there may have been an important element of truth to the statement as well.
Others have treated such borderline cases differently from me because
they have examined different issues from those associated with the organization of agriculture, which serves as the focus of this book. Research
Note A includes a further discussion of these issues and, in addition,
presents three other lists of Marxist nations. My own list has thirty-three
countries, of which twenty-six are found in all of the other three lists. At
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least one authority disputes my inclusion of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Sao Tome, Seychelles, Somalia, and Zimbabwe, and another
disputes my exclusion of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Ghana,
Guinea, Mali, Surinam, Syria, Tanzania, and Zambia. These eighteen
nations of contention must be considered borderline cases.
To digress for a moment, the difficulties in identifying Marxist regimes
impede the development of a theory explaining why certain governments, but not others, have become Marxist regimes. Although this
question is best left to political scientists and historians, we can answer a
simpler but related question of how the process proceeded. 12 Nine of the
nations became Marxist regimes as a result of decisive military interference by another Marxist nation; eleven, as a consequence of an extensive
civil war, either against the existing government or an occupying power;
an additional eleven, as the result of a coup or a revolution from above;
and two, as the outcome of an election. Of the twenty-four countries that
became Marxist without decisive outside interference only one can be
considered industrialized (Czechoslovakia) and only one other (Czarist
Russia), as semi-industrialized. Fifteen of these nations were also colonies within the last two decades of becoming Marxist regimes, and another five had experienced wars against foreign invaders. Thus the question of why one political-economic system was chosen can be narrowed
to the problem of determining the distinguishing characteristics of those
poor nations, often recently decolonized or ravaged by war, that are discussed in this study with a similar group of nations that did not become
Marxist regimes.
This exercise of determining the path to power provides some interesting clues to how the various governments have functioned. As I show
in later chapters, however, it tells us little about how agriculture has
been organized or, for that matter, which nations have decollectivized.
Finally, this study focuses primarily on the forty-year period from 1950
to 1990. Any study dealing with Marxist regimes only in the 1990s would
undoubtedly omit a number of countries in my list. For instance, from
1989 through January 1991, the citizens of some of the countries of my
sample voted out Marxist governments (Cape Verde, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Nicaragua, and Poland). In others the Marxist
regimes disappeared, either as a result of a coup or invasion (Grenada,
12
Nations with decisive interference by another Marxist regime include: Bulgaria, East
Germany, Hungary, Laos, Kampuchea, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, and Romania.
Nations with extensive civil war include: Albania, Angola, China, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, South Yemen, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe. Nations
with coups or revolutions from above include: Afghanistan, Benin, Congo, Czechoslovakia,
Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia, and the Soviet Union.
Nations with elected Marxist parties include Cape Verde and Sao Tome. Among the 24
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Somalia) or merger with a non-Marxist regime (South Yemen). In still
other nations the top government leaders have either renounced Marxism-Leninism (e.g., Benin), distanced themselves from these doctrines
(e.g., Angola, Mozambique), declared that for their economy MarxismLeninism has failed (e.g., Ethiopia), or reached a state of ideological exhaustion (Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Madagascar, Sao Tome, and parts of
Yugoslavia). In a final group of nations the Thermidor will perhaps have
proceeded sufficiently far by the mid-1990s so that the label "Marxist
regime" would no longer aid analysis. Although prediction is risky, these
countries might include Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Congo, Kampuchea, Laos, and Mongolia. Under certain conditions, as I discuss briefly
in chapter 11, it is also possible that some other countries not on my list
may become Marxist regimes or that certain countries such as Nicaragua
might vote back into power revitalized Marxist parties, especially if the
non-Marxist governments prove incapable of dealing successfully with
the nation's economic problems. Marxism-Leninism may be ill in the
early 1990s, but it is far from dead.
Since this book is a study of the impact of Marxist ideas on the organization of agriculture, it is not vitally important to determine whether I
have included all Marxist regimes in the analysis or whether my sample
includes some regimes that others consider as non-Marxist. What is critical is that the sample includes a wide enough range of governments in
which Marxism has had a crucial influence on agricultural policy so that
many national experiences are taken into account.
It is not my intention in this book to march the reader through thirtythree case studies, but rather to use these cases to illuminate a series of
general propositions about agricultural organization in Marxist regimes.
I present much of the important information about specific countries in
tabular form for reference purposes. Thus sufficient data are available for
readers who wish to omit some countries from the analysis and to recalculate my statistical results.
FORCES UNDERLYING THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE

In various Marxist regimes agriculture has played different economic
roles—as a source of food for the urban areas, as a source of exports, as a
source of labor for urban industrial growth, and as a source of finance for
urban investment. These roles have differed according to the level of econations that had become Marxist regimes without decisive outside interference, the following were recent colonies: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau,
Guyana, Madagascar, Mozambique, Sao Tomo, Seychelles, Somalia, Viet Nam, South
Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The following had also experienced recent wars against foreign
aggressors: Albania, China, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.
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nomic development and the available land area, the share of the labor
force in agriculture, what foodstuffs are produced, the importance of exports, and other key economic factors. The level of economic development also influences the government's ability to administer a collectivized agricultural sector in a centralized fashion and, as I indicate in
chapters 10 and 11, to carry out a successful decollectivization. The economic size of the nation is important because of the relatively greater
economic role of foreign trade in small countries and, I should add with
regard to Third World nations, the particularly strategic nature of agricultural exports. Because several of the countries discussed in this study
may be unfamiliar to some readers, it is useful to present several tables
that summarize these causal factors in a systematic fashion.
Population, Level of Development, and Land Area
The nations discussed in this study cover a wide range of economic conditions. Table 1.2 shows some key economic variables and table 1.3 summarizes these data from a worldwide perspective. For this exercise it is
instructive to divide the Marxist regimes into three groups—core countries of the Socialist Commonwealth, other core countries, and periphery, depending upon their political and economic closeness to the Soviet
Union. This type of division provides insight since the three groups have
very different economic characteristics and illustrates the heterogeneity
of the sample under analysis.
Those core countries classified as belonging to the Socialist Commonwealth have a relatively high per capita income and also a much lower
population density (more arable land per capita) than the world average.
The other core countries (the numbers are dominated by China) have
relatively lower per capita incomes, a much smaller share of the gross
world product, and considerably higher population density than the
world average. The peripheral nations have a still lower per capita income and a smaller share of the gross world product, but have a population density roughly equal to the world average.
The Importance of Agriculture
Table 1.4 presents several key indicators of the relative importance of
agriculture in the economies of the sample nations. Again, the major
message is the heterogeneity of the sample. In later chapters I refer to
specific aspects of the data.
The share of the labor force in agriculture gives the simplest picture of
its relative weight in the economy: this sector employs three-fifths or
more of the labor force in most of the African and Asian Marxist regimes
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in the economy, but in the Marxist regimes in the Americas and Europe
13
this share is much lower.
The value added in agriculture as a percentage of factor price GDP
gives another type of measure of the relative importance of agriculture.
Dividing this series with data on the share of the labor force in agricul
ture allows us to compute the relative GDP per economically active in
the two sectors which, in turn, provides a comparison of the relative
productivities and/or compensation of labor of agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. In the third data column, I designate as "relatively back
ward" (RB) those agricultural sectors whose relative GDP per worker is
less than one-fourth that of the nonagricultural sectors in the same na
tion. This measure not only indicates those countries where some type of
agricultural reorganization is most necessary, but also where such reor
ganization is most difficult. It is noteworthy that these relatively back
ward agricultural sectors occur primarily in countries in Africa and Asia.
Although Cuba appears an exception, problems with the data in this
country may appear because of some anomalies in the pricing of agricul
tural and nonagricultural products.
The last four columns present some indicators of the role of agriculture
in foreign trade. This is important for a later discussion of how, in these
countries, an overvalued exchange rate has worked to the particular det
riment of agriculture, and an examination of a useful proposition by Colburn (1986) that the private sector in agriculture has a particularly strong
bargaining position in those countries where agricultural exports or im
ports are important. Of the twenty-four countries for which data are
available, trade in agricultural goods is relatively unimportant in only five
nations (this class is designated as O in the table), most of which are in
East Europe. At the other extreme, agricultural exports play an ex
tremely important role in total exports of nine nations (Βέηίη, Cuba,
Ethiopia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Sao Tome,
and Somalia; this class is designated XX in the table). It is noteworthy
that in six of these nine countries, agricultural products play a key role in
imports (Cuba, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua are the exceptions), which
means not only that their agricultural sectors are relatively specialized
13

For Cape Verde, Mongolia, Seychelles, and South Yemen natural conditions are not
very suitable for agriculture, and this may also be the case for North Korea, which is moun
tainous. I am puzzled, however, by the inclusion of Sao Ύοταέ in this list, since it is a very
poor nation specializing in agricultural exports. Moreover, this nation has a relatively low
degree of urbanization (only 15.6 percent of the population lived in urban areas larger than
two thousand people). The census data for 1981 do not suggest that agricultural workers are
classified in related industries: the share of the economically active engaged in forestry and
fishing is 4.8 percent and in agro-industries, 1.2 percent. The degree to which the Sao
Tome data are comparable to those of the other nations is unknown.
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TABLE 1.2

Some Key Economic Variables of Marxist Regimes, 1980
Population
(1000s)
Core Countries: Socialist Commonwealth
Bulgaria
8,862
9,724
Cuba
15,225
Czechoslovakia
16,737
Germany, East
Hungary
10,771
Kampuchea
6,400
Laos
3,683
Mongolia
1,663
Poland
35,578
Romania
22,201
Viet Nam
54,175
USSR
265,542
450,501
Total
Weighted average
Core Countries: Other
Albania
China
Korea, North
Yugoslavia
Total
Weighted average

2,671
1,017,561
18,025
22,295
1,060,552

Countries of the Periphery
Afghanistan
15,950
Angola
7,581
Benin
3,464
Cape Verde
296
Congo
1,605
Ethiopia
37,717
Grenada
89
Guinea-Bissau
809
Guyana
792
Madagascar
8,714
Mozambique
12,094
Nicaragua
2,672
Sao Tom6
94
Seychelles
63
Somalia
4,674
Yemen, South
1,969

Population
per arable
hectares

Per capita GDPI

(%ofU.S.)

2.1
3.0
2.9
3.3
2.0
2.1
4.2
1.4
2.4
2.1
8.2
1.1

43.0%
30.9
61.4
69.2
48.3
4.2
4.2
4.2
43.9
34.6
2.8
49.3

1.5

42.2

3.8
10.2
8.0
2.8
9.6
1.1

20.7
10.3
10.4
41.5

2.0
2.2
1.9
7.4
2.4
2.7
6.4
2.8
1.6
2.9
3.9
2.1
2.6
12.6
4.4
12.6

5.2
6.1
4.7
8.3
8.6
2.8
13.2
3.4
14.2
5.2
5.6
17.6
6.0
18.4
3.6
4.7

Notes on GDP

Very rough estimate.

Very rough estimate.
Very rough estimate.
Very rough estimate.

Very rough estimate.

Very rough estimate.
See note below.
Very rough estimate.

11.0
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T A B L E 1.2 (cont.)

Population
(1000s)
Zimbabwe

6,976

Total
Weighted average
Grand total
Grand weighted
average

Population
per arable
hectares

Per capita GDP

2.7

8.2

2.7

5.0

3.7

19.3

(%ofU.S.)

Notes on GDP

105,559
1,616,612

Source: The population data come from United Nations (1988a, table 3), the land data come from Food
and Agricultural Organization (data files), and most GDP data come from Robert Summers and Alan
Heston (1988).
Notes: Summers and Heston (1988) estimate the per capita GDP of China as 264 percent that of India;
the World Bank (annual, 1982, p. 110) estimates the same statistic as 121 percent that of India. I have
taken an unweighted average as my estimate. The estimates designated as "very rough" represent little
more than educated guesses on my part.
TABLE

1.3

Summary of Key Economic Parameters of Marxist Regimes
Groups of Nations

Percent of World
Poputeion

Arable Land

GDP

Classified by Political Criteria
Core Countries
Socialist Commonwealth
Other

10.0%
23.6

20.1%
7.6

15.8%
9.7

2.4

2.7

0.4

36.0

30.4

26.0

Africa
America
Asia
Europe

1.9
0.3
25.0
8.9

2.1
0.3
8.3
19.6

0.3
0.3
9.2
16.2

Total

36.0

30.4

26.0

Countries of Periphery
Total
Classified by Continents

Source: See Table 1.2.
Notes: To calculate these percentages for the GDP, I had to make rough estimates for
nations not included in the calculations by Summers and Heston (1988).
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Guyana
Nicaragua

RB
G
G
G

22.6
c. 24.9

26.8
46.6

G
RB

—

RB

c. 6.8
c. 20.8

c. 23.6
7.2
48.2
14.1

—

—

20.5
13.3
50.9
38.4
48.0
RB
G
RB
RB

—
G

—

ReI. Agr.
Sec. Dev.

46.7

Value Added in
Agriculture as
Percent of Factor Price GDP,
1979-81

23.8
c. 28.5

56.1
14.0
75.5
72.8

Sao Tome
Seychelles
Somalia
Zimbabwe

Americas
Cuba
Grenada

33.1
62.4
79.8
82.3
80.9
84.5

73.8
70.2

Cape Verde
Congo
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
Madagascar
Mozambique

Africa
Angola
Benin

Percent of
Economically
Active PopuL·tion in Agriculture: 1980

TABLE 1.4

17.6
30.7
15.7
14.6

86.6
90.6
45.5
87.6

c. 24.5
20.4
39.7
3.4

45.9
16.7
13.8
30.7
20.3
13.6

37.8
2.3
92.9
57.1
82.8
41.5
c. 99.3
16.6
97.7
37.9

17.5
26.5

Imports

12.0
92.4

Exports

Agricultural Trade
as Percent of:

The Economic Role of Agriculture, 1980

X
XX

XX
XXM

XXM
M
XXM
X

XM
O
XX
XXM
XXM
X

O
XXM

Class

Sugar
Spices, bananas, cocoa
Sugar, rice
Coffee, cotton,
meat, maize

Animals
tobacco, cotton, sugar

Coffee, hides
Oil seeds
Coffee, spices
Nuts, cotton,
sugar
Cocoa

Oils, cocoa,
cotton
Bananas

Major Agricultural Exports
for Countries
where Agricultural Exports
are Important
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29.8
28.3
20.0
32.3

26.6
26.4
c. 12.4
12.4

G
G
G
G

—
16.8

—
26.5
10.4

6.3

—
3.9
11.8

11.4

13.5

4.4

—
23.4

—
—

15.0

—
—
—
—
—

15.4
38.7

—
—

1.9

—
—
—
—
—

49.9
22.3

M
O

—

O

X

—

O

—
—

O

—
—
—
—
—

X
XM

Meat, cereals,
vegetables

Fruits, cotton
Vegetables,
fruits, tea

Source: See Statistical Note A.
Notes: Dashes (—) indicate no data are available. The c. before the factor price ratios indicates that some type of estimate was made. For countries
where only the market price GDP data were available, the calculated ratio was increased by 5 percent; for countries where only a net material
product data were available, the calculated ratio was decreased by 20 percent (to take into account the omitted depreciation and service sectors, as
well as the fact that the data are calculated in market prices). For several other countries, I made smaller adjustments. For Cape Verde, Grenada,
Sao Tome, and Seychelles the data cover more sectors than agriculture since they include fishing and forestry; and for these particular nations the
data refer respectively to 1980, 1981, 1981, and 1985.
ReI. ag. sec. dev. = relative agricultural sector development. If the value added per economically active in agriculture is less than one-fourth
the value added per economically active in the nonagricultural sphere, the agricultural sector is considered "relatively backward" (RB). The G
designates a situation where the value added per person in agriculture is greater than one-fourth of non-agricultural sectors.
Trade in agricultural goods includes all trade in SITC categories 0, 1, 21, 22, 232, 29, 4 and certain categories within 26. It proved impossible to
use exclusively "general" or "special" imports and exports for this calculation. The trade "class" is defined in terms of total exports or imports and
is designated as O if agricultural exports and imports comprise less than 20 percent of the totals; X or M if agricultural exports or imports comprise
20 to 49.9 percent of the totals; and XX or MM if agricultural exports or imports comprise 50 or more percent of the totals. For the major exports,
"oils" refers to vegetable oils. The important exports are only listed for countries with a trade "class" of X or XX.

Poland
Romania
USSR
Yugoslavia

55.9
22.7
12.9
10.0
19.9

Europe
Albania
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Germany, East
Hungary
G
G
G
G

c. 12.1

—

—
RB

—

—

RB

c. 13.2

22.6
13.4
11.8
24.9

—
—
—

—
—
—

74.4
42.8
75.7
39.8
67.5
41.1

Kampuchea
Korea, North
Laos
Mongolia
Viet Nam
Yemen, South

G
RB

c. 54.6
c. 34.5

61.0
74.2

Asia
Afghanistan
China
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CHAPTER 1

but also that they face more risks on the world market because of their
lack of self-sufficiency in food. Later chapters discuss the role of these
factors in a more rigorous and thorough fashion.
PLAN OF ATTACK

For the most part I have based this study on the primary and secondary
literature of the thirty-three nations under review, supplemented by unpublished reports of international organizations. For some chapters, particularly those dealing with the most recent agricultural reforms, I have
also used materials gathered from interviews of experts and government
officials both inside and outside of the nations, as well as from discussions
with farm directors and workers in eight of the nations under review.
Any broad study of the economic organization of agriculture in Marxist
regimes must deal with five major topics: the important ideological views
about the sector; the origin and development of the major forms of productive units; the internal organization of the farms and their external
links with related sectors; major governmental agricultural policies and
their results; and the changes in the organizational structure in recent
years. These topics guide the analysis in the following chapters.
The next chapter, which forms the second segment of this introduction, focuses on both the general Marxist doctrines on agriculture and
the policy issues leading to collectivization. Although classical Marxist
writers wrote extensively about agriculture, they included little discussion about collectivization or the organization of agriculture in the transition to communism. This raises a number of questions: To what extent
are the parallels drawn by Marx between the paths of economic development in agriculture and industry persuasive? To what degree have
Marxian predictions about developments in agriculture been validated in
leading capitalist nations over the last century? If, as I argue, only partial
responsibility for agricultural collectivization can be laid at the doorstep
of Marx, what were the other crucial elements in this decision in the
Soviet Union? If many of the specific policy problems leading to Soviet
collectivization were specific to that country, why did most other Marxist
regimes also collectivize? To answer these and similar questions, it is essential to separate Marxist propositions, attitudes, and examples and to
provide some notion of the range of policies receiving justification from
the same doctrinal source.
Land Reforms and Collectivization
This part deals with the painful processes of creating a socialist agricultural sector. Most, but not all Marxist regimes have carried out land re-
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forms, but the specific measures of these reforms have been quite different. The most important causal mechanisms for these differences receive
considerable attention and give rise to a number of questions: How can
the different types of land reform measures be explained? Why have certain Marxist nations collectivized and others not? What are the key relationships between the land reform and collectivization processes? Why
have different countries focused either on state farms or collective farms?
And why have various Marxist regimes taken very different strategies to
achieve full collectivization? The comparative analyses in chapters 3 and
4 provide useful clues for the answers to these questions.
Structural Elements
Chapters 5 and 6 focus attention on both external and internal organizational issues. The former refers to horizontal and vertical integration of
the farms; that is, the size of the farms and the manner in which they
obtain inputs and sell their outputs. The latter refers to the way in which
the state and collective farms organize their productive activities and
compensate their labor force. From the descriptive materials a number
of questions arise: Why have collective and state farms continued to grow
in size over the years? How do the various ways for resolving problems of
external organization influence the performance of the agricultural sector
or the ease with which decollectivization can occur? What are the competitive and complementary elements between the socialist agricultural
sector and the individual plots that are allowed farmers on collective
farms? What are the options facing collective and state farm managers in
organizing production and how does this choice effect performance or the
speed of organizational change? The analysis yields insights into these
questions and is supplemented by a research note presenting a model of
decision-making by collective and state farm directors in a centrally
planned economy in order to show in a rigorous fashion why it is likely
that the dynamic efficiency of these farms is lower than in market economies.
Policy and Performance
The performance of agriculture is influenced not just by the organizational structure, but also by governmental policies. Chapter 7 deals with
policies issues and three critical questions about them: Although policies
vary a great deal from one country to another, depending upon the specific agricultural conditions, what are the elements common to all? To
what extent are these policies distinctly influenced by Marxist doctrines?
And to what extent are such policies tied to the organizational structure
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of agriculture? In chapter 8 I examine what the major differences are in
agricultural performance between Marxist and non-Marxist nations. This
quantitative exercise requires a separation of the respective influences of
Marxist ideology in general, central economic planning of agriculture,
and collectivization. I place particular emphasis on dynamic, rather than
static, criteria of evaluation and show that the lower growth of total factor
productivity is the major distinguishing characteristic of Marxist agriculture. This conclusion parallels Murrell's (1989) empirical analysis of
Marxist foreign trade showing that these nations have a lower generation
and adoption of technological and organizational innovation than comparable nations in the West.
Reforms and the Future
In chapter 9 I examine the question of decollectivization from the viewpoint of the farmer and try to review those factors that increase the difficulty of the process. For instance, decollectivization is more likely to occur in Marxist regimes with agricultural sectors employing a relatively
simple technology than in those nations which have a relatively mechanized agriculture and in those countries where property rights can be
enforced. In the next two chapters I analyze problems of the reform of
the organization of agriculture from the viewpoint of the government. In
chapter 10 I investigate the different types of agricultural reforms taking
place in the various Marxist regimes at the beginning of the 1990s and
explore the major problems arising in changing the property relations, of
marketizing the agricultural sector, and of changing farm management
practices. A research note covers in greater detail the agricultural reforms in China, Guyana, Hungary, and the USSR. Chapter 11 provides
an analysis of some macroeconomic issues, including the phasing of economic and political reforms and the timing of particular economic
changes that play a major role in the success of agricultural reforms. The
book ends with some reflections on the rise and possible fall of collectivized agriculture.
The furrow plowed in this book is long and difficult, and at this point
the fruitfulness of the harvest is far from certain. Much more can be said
about what should be done and how it should be accomplished, but since
the major goals of the analysis should be clear, this prologue should end.
Now it is time to roll up our sleeves and begin.
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